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Twenty-First-Century Challenges: 
The Use of Military Forces to Combat 
Criminal Threats 
Juan Carlos Gomez· 
I can't change the direction of the wind, but 1 call adjust my sails to always 
reach my destination. ' 
Introduction 
Globalization confronts governments with new threats. Moises Nairn, editor of Foreign Po/icy, described these threats as follows: 
The illegal trade in drugs, anns, intellectual property, people, and money is booming. 
Like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits governments 
against agile, stateless, and resourceful networks empowered by globalization. Govern-
ments will continue to lose these wars until they adopt new strategies to deal with a 
larger, unprecedented struggle that now shapes the world as much as confrontations 
between nation-states once did.2 
The use of military forces by democratic States in the fight against these criminal 
threats is viable and necessary; however, it is important to know when and how 
military forces may be used legitimately. To do so, it is necessary to understand the 
transformation of the threat-armed groups, which once challenged governments 
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over ideology, now seek financial gain for themselves. While allegedly espousing 
ideological politics at both ends of the political spectrum (extreme left and right), 
these groups have created sinister alliances that ignore geographic and political 
boundaries.3 This transformation challenges State security and puts the institu-
tional structures of democratic States at risk. 
In confronting this new reality, military forces must adapt if they are to effec-
tively neutralize this merger of criminal gangs and terrorist groups. The theories 
and concepts that guided the State-on-State battlefields of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, where the opposing belligerents could distinguish their enemy 
and when guerrilla warfare was conducted in isolated areas far from population 
centers, will be inadequate to address the new challenge of the criminal terrorist. 4 
Rather, new theories and guidance must be developed if military forces are to be 
successfully employed in this new form of conflict. 
Similarly, military forces must develop an understanding of the law that will 
apply when combating these criminal/terrorist groups. That law will come from 
human rights law (HRl)5 and international humanitarian law (lHL),6 which in 
"classic" international law are referred to as "the law of peace" and the "law of war," 
respectively. The determination of when each will apply presents new challenges 
for military forces that have traditionally focused on the law applicable to interna-
tional armed conilict. 
This article will explore these issues from a Colombian perspective, a country 
which has been engaged for decades in an armed struggle with insurgent groups 
and now also with criminal groups using terrorist tactics for economic gain 
through the drug trade.7 
The Legal Framework for the Use of Force 
Human rights law transformed traditional Westphalian sovereignty by providing 
that international law can extend into a State and regulate the relationship be-
tween an individual citizen and the government. In its specifics, HRl addresses 
many aspects of an individual's relationship with the government, such as partici-
pation in the political process. However, it is HRL's regulation of an individual's 
encounters with law enforcement agents and the courts that is the most relevant 
when considering actions that are taken against the criminal terrorist. These 
norms are designed to protect the citizen from unlawful government actions, 
while at the same time providing law enforcement agencies the ability to protect 
citizens from criminal actions and for the judicial system to punish those who do 
commit crimes. 
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On the other hand, international humanitarian law permits the use of force to 
restore peace in international and non-international conflicts, while at the same 
time minimizing unnecessary suffering to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 
IHL has evolved since its inception, particularly in the post-World War II era, with 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the two 1977 Additional Protocols and numer-
ous conventions regulating the use of some weapons and outlawing others. One 
feature of this evolution has been the expansion of IHL from its application solely 
to international armed conflict to non -international or internal armed conflict. 
It is this law that regulates Colombian military forces in the conduct of military op-
erations against the well-organized, well-equipped narco-trafficking groups oper-
ating within Colombia. 
Human Rights or International Humanitarian Law-Which Governs? 
Unfortunately, what seems to be the clear delineation between HRL ("law of 
peace") and IHL ("law of war") becomes gray in internal conflicts arising from the 
new threats that confront governments. Traditionally, counternarcotic efforts 
were law enforcement in nature, even in a country such as the United States which 
declared a "war on drugs." As such, HRL was the component of international law 
that applied to those efforts. The illegal armed groups operating within Colombia, 
however, clearly fulfill the definition of an "organized armed group," which, when 
combined with the level of violence in which they engage, permits the use of force 
under the IHL applicable to non-international armed conflicts to be applied 
against them. That the motive fo r the use of violence is now economic versus polit-
ical makes no difference. However, while the right to use military force against 
these groups is clear, the ability to do so is difficult because they camouflage them-
selves within the civilian population. There the application offorce against them is 
even more difficult than it was when they operated in isolated jungle-covered areas 
of the country. 
In using force in this new battlefield, mistakes have been made by the armed 
forces. This has strained the credibility of Colombian government institutions re-
sponsible fo r the conduct of mili tary operations and led to criminal prosecutions 
of those involved. While it remains clear that the level of threat continues to re-
quire the involvement of Colombian military forces8 applying offensive and lethal 
force, it is equally clear that every reasonable precaution must be taken to ensure 
that the use of that force is directed only against legitimate military objectives in ac-
cordance with IHL. 
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We Fight among the People 
[I]ncreasingly we conduct operations amongst the people. The people in the cities, 
towns, streets and their houses-all the people, anywhere-----<.:an be on the battlefield. 
Military engagements can take place against formed and recognizable groups of ene-
mies moving amongst civilians, against enemies disguised as civilians, and uninten-
tionally and intentionally against civilians. 9 
The FllerzasArmadasRevolllcionarias de Colombia (FARC), the principal crimi-
nal terrorist group, and the other narco-trafficking groups generally do not possess 
the capability to engage in conventional armed confrontations with Colombia's 
military forces. Today, the armed and criminal groups move and act among the 
people, obtaining benefits from a portion of the citizenry both voluntarily and 
through extortion. 
The brutality of the criminal terrorist groups is unquestioned. They are not sup-
ported by most of the population, but this does not necessarily result in support for 
the government forces who act to protect the public. To the contrary, each mistake 
or illegal or illegitimate act by a public official damages the people's confidence in 
the government. 1O The cum ulative consequence of these allegations of misconduct 
is to turn public opinion against the government and those whose responsibility it 
is to protect them. In effect, the protectors of society become the abusers of society. 
Public opinion is turned against the government and law enforcement agencies 
and military forces. 
Because law enforcement agencies are often incapable of effectively addressing 
the threat of the criminal terrorist groups, military forces are often called on to op-
erate in this new environment among the people. Military forces must redesign 
their doctrine to confront the new threats. In today's war there is no victory, no ca-
pitulation by a defeated enemy. As Rupert Smith indicates, "[ 0 I ur operations have 
become increasingly timeless; they go on and on ."11 The use of military force alone 
cannot eliminate the threat posed by these groups; it can only contribute positively 
or negatively to the ultimate outcome. The illegal armed groups do not seek a mili-
tary victory; they are interested only in creating chaos and provoking overreaction 
by military forces with the objective of causing a loss of support for the govern-
ment, thereby perpetuating never-ending conflicts. 
The defeat of illegal and criminal armed gangs will not be accomplished 
through military force. Rather, States must employ methods to dismantle them 
that comply with the law and bring individual members to courts for prosecution. 
This will require the cooperation of the citizenry of the country. To gain that 
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cooperation, the population can never be confused with the enemy and the crimi-
nals. If it is, the population will become the enemy. 
Strategies must be developed to obtain the population 's support for the State's 
efforts to combat the criminal gangs. These strategies must be designed not just to 
end citizens' complicity with the gangs. They must also end the belief that the pop-
ulation can be neutral in the conflict. What is required isa supportive and coopera-
tive population that assists national institutional authorities in their efforts. In 
other words, an environment must be created in which each individual citizen feels 
secure in denouncing the criminal gangs and assisting in the elimination of the 
support structures for criminal activities. While military and police forces must 
play an important role in establishing this environment, individual members of so-
ciety will also have a role to play. 
A temporary presence of government forces is insufficient to establish this envi-
ronment. In areas that organized armed groups have controlled, the citizens will 
not provide the necessary support if they believe police and military forces will 
soon withdraw, thus allowing the criminal groups to return. As a result, the new 
strategy must envision a permanent presence and an assurance to the population 
that the government forces will be there as long as is necessary. 
The use of military force is not always the best option to deal with the activities 
of the illegal and criminal groups. If m istakes, either intentional or unintentional, 
are made in attempts to neutralize the threat and innocent members of the popula-
tion become victims, this is exactly what criminal gangs desire. This delegitimizes 
the State and its democratic institutions. If military force is necessary it must be 
used carefully and in full compliance with the law. However, in many instances the 
more appropriate response is law enforcement actions designed to arrest and pros-
ecute individual group members. 
It has been obselVed that "the British Army was the Irish Republican Army's 
best recruiter. By targeting Catholic civilians and arbitrarily arresting and killing 
suspected I.R.A. members, the British angered many young men who turned to the 
I.R..A. as their only hope for survival; it was also a way to get revenge. "12 This history 
lesson is also important in the Colombian context. Noncompliance with the rule of 
law can lead-and has led-some to join the FARC and other criminal groups; can 
cause a delegitimization of the government, the armed forces and police; and can 
result in an increase in the number of disciplinary and judicial cases against offi-
cials involved in unlawful acts. 
New Missions for the Armed Forces 
Colombia is not the only country in the Western Hemisphere that uses its military 
forces within its borders in missions other than national defense of the nation. 
283 
The Use o[ Military ForCe$ to Com bat Criminal Threa ts 
El Salvador's President Mauricio Funes, immediately upon assuming office in 
2009, ordered military forces to participate in combating the mara salvatrucha 
gang. U El Salvadoran military forces continue to be employed in that role. 14 In 
Brazil, military forces contribute to the law enforcement efforts of the police 
against the criminal and narco-traffic bands in the favelas. 15 The same use of mili-
tary forces can be observed in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon in 2006 de-
clared "war against the narco-traffickers," a "war" engaged in by the federal police, 
the army and the navy.16To a lesser degree, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru are also 
using their military forces to address security-related issues within their borders. 
Adaptation to the New Operational Environment 
As was indicated previously, criminal activity would ideally be dealt with exclu-
sively as a law enforcement matter that could be addressed by law enforcement 
agencies. Unfortunately, the capabilities and economic capacity of the illegal 
armed groups and the organized crime organizations are such that they are beyond 
the ability oflaw enforcement agencies, acting alone, to address. In these circum-
stances, governments may legitimately call upon military forces to maintain social 
order and address the threat created by these groups and organizations. Military 
forces must adapt, however, to these new missions and operational environment if 
they are going to effectively and efficiently neutralize the threats they have been 
called on to address; failure to do so will result in loss of support from the govern-
ment and citizens. 
Particularly over the last eight years, Colombian military forces and law en-
forcement agencies have been successful in reducing the threat posed by criminal 
organizations and illegal armed groups. Several have been defeated, and the capa-
bilities of those that remain have been greatly reduced. In addition, the level of vio-
lence within the country has greatly decreased. In many areas, the threat has been 
reduced to the point that military forces no longer need to be used in a traditional 
military capacity. In those areas, criminal activity, including terrorist acts, can now 
be dealt with as a law enforcement matter. The rule oflaw has been reestablished 
and a security environment established where HRL-not IHL-is applied by mili-
tary forces performing law enforcement functions. In these areas, illegal armed 
groups and criminal organizations do not control portions of the territory, al-
though they continue to operate within them. In response to pressure brought by 
military forces and law enforcement agencies in these areas, the illegal armed 
groups and criminal organizations simply move their areas of operations to less 
controlled areas; this is what is known as the "bubble effect." 
In those places in Colombia where the FARC still possesses a viable military ca-
pability, Colombian military forces employ the use offorce in accordance with IHL 
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to combat it. Offensive operations, in the classic sense, remain an option in isolated 
areas away from population centers. However, when operations are conducted 
among the people, care must be taken in the application of force. Unnecessarily 
causing harm to civilians or their property can create greater long- term issues than 
the immediate military advantage gained. While IHL remains the governing law, 
the use of force must be more restrictively applied as a last resort and should only 
be used when necessary in legitimate defense of the military force and when there is 
no other alternative to accomplish the assigned mission. 
The criminal organizations now operating in Colombia, whose motives are eco-
nomic instead of political, are not interested in a negotiated settlement that would 
provide them a place in the politicaJ process. While they speak of a desire to negoti-
ate, they do so only to obtain immediate benefits and perpetuate the conflict. They 
look to intervention by churches, politicians, social leaders and international orga-
nizations weary of the long conflict. The criminal groups not only subsist among 
the people; they use the population for their benefit. 
The questions that must be answered are how military forces are to be used in a 
role far different from their principal purpose of maintaining national security 
against external threats, and how combating criminal activity can be successively 
accomplished while at the same time retaining that most important attribute of na-
tional and international legitimacy. 
Knowing the Threat 
Knowing and understanding the type of threat to be confronted is of fundamental 
importance. Real-time intelligence information on the criminal organization's ob-
jective, capabilities and membership is essential to formulating strategy and 
courses of action . 
Participation of Military Lawyers 
The complexity of international and domestic law and the expectation in Western 
democracies that the government and military forces will conduct themselves in 
accordance with the law require that military lawyers be involved in all aspects of 
military operations, from their planning and execution to post-execution evaJua-
tion and analysis. I ] These military lawyers must have the knowledge and experi-
ence to be credible with the commanders they advise. The value of such 
participation by military lawyers has been demonstrated in Colombia. 
Rules for the Use of Force 
There must be clear, understandable rules provided to military forces on the cir-
cumstances under which force may be used and the type and degree of that force . 
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This is dependent on the mission assigned to the forces. In Colombia, two differ-
ently colored cards are used. A blue card is used when the military unit is engaged 
in a law enforcement mission. The rules on the blue card are based on HRL. They 
provide for the use of force only when no other option is available to accomplish 
the mission and in self-defense of the person and others. The red card is used in op-
erations against military objectives. These cards are based on IHL and permit the 
offensive use of force, including lethal force if demanded by military necessity. 
Coordination with the Judicial Branch of Government 
The military forces must coordinate their efforts with the judicial branch and the 
federal police. In the case of Colombia, this is the Office of the Attorney General 
and the National Police, and subordinate organizations. Each military operation 
undertaken as a law enforcement mission is undertaken in conjunction with law 
enforcement agencies so that effective criminal prosecutions can take place. These 
normally occur in the new operating area among the people, where adherence to 
HRL is critical. 
Investigation of Allegations of Miscondud by Military Members and Public Officials 
Allegations of criminal misconduct by law enforcement agents and members of the 
military are inevitable when operating in the middle of the population. These must 
be openly and effectively investigated. When allegations are substantiated criminal 
prosecutions must be initiated. When investigations don't support the allegations, 
the results must be publicly shared, including the factual details of the incident or 
event in question. Thorough, complete and transparent investigations are neces-
sary to maintain public support. The worst strategy is government silence, which 
permits the media and others to speculate or to tell their versions of what they be-
lieved happened. 
Truth Is Paramount 
Mistakes and errors have been made and will be made by military members and 
law enforcement agents, even when actions are taken in good faith. When these oc-
cur, they must be truthfully revealed and explained. Too often , innocent mistakes 
have been covered up with falsehoods. Actions taken in good faith but with unex-
pected results can be accepted; falsehoods and cover-ups cannot.IS As with failures 
to effectively investigate allegations of misconduct, falsehoods and cover-ups lead 
to a loss of public support. 
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Institutional Loyalty 
When a military member or law enforcement agent engages in criminal conduct, 
the institution concerned, whether it is the armed forces or federal police, must 
provide that individual the rights provided by domestic law, but must not be seen 
as defending the conduct in question. Loyalty must be given to the institution as a 
whole, not to the individual member. Regrettably, in Colombia there have been in-
stances when military members or law enforcement agents have used their position 
of authority to commit crimes. When they go unpunished, there are political, legal 
and economic costs to the government and institution concerned, and credibility 
and public support suffer. 
Tactical Operations Catl Impact National Strategy 
Throughout histol)', conflict has been analyzed at three levels: strategic, opera-
tional and tactical. The national strategic level involves development of national 
policy and objectives, and the use of resources to accomplish those objectives. At 
the operational level, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and 
sustained to accomplish strategic objectives. At the tactical level, military missions 
are planned and executed to accomplish milital)' objectives. Today, those levels are 
closer together than at any time in the past. Technological advances, social net-
works and an almost instantaneous communications capability allow what is oc-
curring at the tactical level to be made known literally around the world. Because 
tactical situations can, and often do, have effects at the strategic level in terms of 
public perceptions and opinion-both negative and positive-it is essential that 
commanders at the strategic and operational levels be in communication with, and 
in control of, military units operating at the tactical level. They must have the ca-
pacity to react and adapt to the circumstances as they occur on the ground. 
Political and Judicial Concerns Arising from the New Operating Environment 
The risk oflegal action being taken against them is the greatest concern of military 
members and law enforcement agents operating in the new environment. In Co-
lombia, the potential of criminal and disciplinary investigations being initiated has 
reduced morale among members and agents. It has caused some to decide in cer-
tain circumstances that it is safer not to act, as taking action might subject them to 
an investigation. Another concern is that making allegations of criminal conduct 
against public officials and administrative demands of the government is both 
politically and financially profitable. 
Beyond the impact on the individual who is the subject of the allegation, alle-
gations of misconduct damage the credibility of the government. When the 
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allegations have a basis in fact, action to investigate and hold persons accountable 
is required. Responses to false allegations must publicly identify the allegations as 
false, and action must be taken against those who make such allegations when 
they violate Colombian criminal law. Care must be taken in doing so, however; 
nothing can damage the credibility and reputation of the institution concerned 
more than to find an allegation is unsupported on the basis of an inadequate or 
incomplete investigation when the allegation is, in faa, true. False allegations 
must be vigorously refuted; a failure to do so is nearly the same as accepting the 
allegation as true. 
The inevitable result of the use of military force, whether in international or 
non-international armed conflict, is that innocent persons will be killed and in-
jured and civilian property will be damaged and destroyed. When this occurs, the 
government must be prepared to accept responsibility and compensate those who 
suffered losses. To fail to do so harms morale among civilians and can turn them 
into supporters of the armed groups combating the government. 
In Colombia, there are both non-judicial and judicial processes to evaluate 
claims for damages caused by military forces and to promptly provide adequate 
compensation to those harmed. This not only has the benefit of promoting good-
will, but also reduces the likelihood that allegations of criminal misconduct will be 
brought against the military members causing the harm. 
Final Reflections 
Nairn, in his "The Five Wars of Globalization" article, concludes: 
These five wars stretch and even render obsolete many of the existing institutions, legal 
frameworks, military doctrines and law enforcement techniques on which gov-
ernments have relied fo r years. Analr>ts need to rethink the concept of war "fronts" 
defined by geography and the defmition of "combatants" according to the Geneva 
Convention. The functions of intelligence agents, soldiers, police officers, or immigra-
tion officers need rethinking and adaption to the new realities.19 
Facing the reality that threats to national security today are more likely to arise 
from within rather than from outside, as Nairn suggested in 2003, governments, 
including that of Colombia, have rethought how to employ their military fo rces to 
confront these new threats. Colombia's experience has demonstrated that while 
military forces can be used lawfully in the fight against these in ternal threats to 
security and democratic stability, they must adopt new strategies and doctrine to 
effectively combat these threats that are largely centered in the population. A 
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failure to do so has the potential to more severely damage the State-and State in-
stitutions-than does the threat against which military forces are employed. 
If military forces arc used in a law enforcement capacity to deal with criminal 
conduct, the law that governs will be HRl. It requires more restrained use of force 
than is provided under IHL. While military forces can operate effectively under 
both regimes, the Colombian experience demonstrates that it is essential that mili-
tary forces understand the law under which they are operating on missions to 
which they are assigned. Misapprehension of the legal regime can result in exces-
sive use of force, increased risk to military personnel and mission fail ure. 
Democratic societies in the twenty-first century enjoy the benefits and freedoms 
provided by HRL, and demand that their governments provide them the rights and 
guarantees set forth in the various human rights instruments. Colombia is no 
exception. The Colombian population appreciates the threat posed by the criminal 
gangs, but expects that the government's response and the actions oflaw enforce-
ment organizations and military forces will be fully consistent with that law. It will 
not tolerate excesses. 
The privilege to govern and have the monopoly on the lawful use of force within 
a society obligates those who have that privilege to use force in full compliance with 
the law, whether it be HRL or IHL, and to adhere to the highest ethical and moral 
values. The wind has blown and societies have changed. Now governments must 
adjust their sails and respond to internal threats within the framework of the law; 
their societies expect nothing less. 
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